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Camus’ Absurdism and African Perspectives on the Question of Life’s Meaning

Lecturer: Augustine Obi

Originally Taught: Summer School 2024

In The Myth of Sisyphus (1975), Albert Camus famously claims that human life is absurd and will remain so. Camus explains that the absurd is the futility of humanity’s yearning for meaning in a world that is highly incomprehensible and devoid of God. For Camus, the only legitimate response to the absurdity of life is to wholeheartedly embrace meaninglessness, epitomised by the Ancient Greek mythological figure of Sisyphus. 

This course will concern the following question: if the world is meaningless and absurd, as Camus boldly asserts, how does Camus’ absurdism compare with the African philosophical perspectives on human existence? What exactly would constitute an African response to Albert Camus’ idea of absurdity, and where might African reflections on the meaning of life sit in relation to canonical philosophical literature? Through exploring these questions, this course will attempt to investigate the question of life’s meaning from a primarily African philosophical perspective. 

The course commences with a survey of Albert Camus’ position that our lives are absurd. Then, we will assess different theories of the meaningfulness of life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. Ultimately, the course is purposed to provoke a discourse around Camus’ conception of the absurd, using the different theories of meaning in African philosophy to demonstrate how Camus’ absurdism and African theories of meaning are at odds, and how each of the African theories of meaning can align with concepts from other philosophical traditions to merit global philosophical attention.

Lecture One – Analysing Camus’ Absurdism 

The course will begin by providing a detailed analysis of Camus’ conception of absurdism as seen in his essay, The Myth Sisyphus. By giving a detailed exposition of Camus’ absurdism, we will see how Camus popularised absurdism by claiming that the world is irrational, and that what is absurd is humanity’s confrontation of this irrational world, and humanity’s primitive yearning to make sense of it. Camus illustrates his conception of the absurd “with a striking image of the human fate: Sisyphus endlessly pushing his rock up the mountain only to see it roll back down each time he gains the top” (Aronson 2011). For Camus, what this means is that “life had no meaning, that nothing exists that could ever be a source of meaning, and hence there is something deeply absurd about the human quest to find meaning” (Macguire 2015).

Readings: 

  • Aronson, R. 2011. “Albert Camus.” In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/camus/
  • Camus, Albert. 1975. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Trans. J. O’Brien. New York: Penguin.
  • Macguire, L. 2015. “Camus and Absurdism.” Philosophy Talk, 27 February. https:// www,philosophytalk.org/blog/camus-and-absurdity
  • Mlungwana, Yoliswa. 2020. An African Response to Absurdism. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39:2, 140-152. https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2020.1771823
  • Mlungwana, Yolanda., 2020. An African Approach to the Meaning of Life. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 153-165.

Lecture Two – African Approaches to the Meaning Of Life: African Conceptions of Personhood and the Question of Meaning

After assessing Camus’ conception of absurdism, the successive lectures will explore how characteristically African theories of meaning provide a contrasting response to Camus’ position. In this second lecture, we will consider the link between African conceptions of personhood and the question of life’s meaning. Specifically, we will engage with and beyond leading African scholars (like Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye) who claim that personhood is earned, not normatively given at birth, and that achieving personhood can inevitably lead to a meaningful life. Thus, to be a person, individuals must convert and hone their innate raw capacities to acquire moral excellence–to live a meaningful life is to build the capacities that enable one to live a satisfactory level of moral excellence.

Readings:

  • Molefe, M., 2020. Personhood and a Meaningful Life in African Philosophy. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 194-207.
  • Ifeanyi Menkiti, ‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought’ in African Philosophy: An Introduction, R. A. Wright (ed) (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984).
  • Micheal Onyebuchi Eze, Ubuntu: Ideology or Promise?” in Exploring Humanity: Intercultural Perspectives on Humanism, National University of Taiwan Press: 247-259

Lecture Three: The African Vital Force Theory of Meaning

Having seen how the African conception of personhood is tied to the question of life’s meaning, lecture three will attempt to appeal to the African theory of vital force to ground a theory of life’s meaning. First popularised by Placide Tempels, in African normative thought, vital force is an imperceptible energy–the animating soul or essence that “inheres in everything in the universe in varying degrees and complexities” (Metz, T, 2020). When it comes to life’s meaning, the prevailing thought in the African philosophical literature is that vital force implicates affect, and thus can either be maximised or diminished. As we will see, a meaningful life is one that maximises one’s life force and the life force of others, and any failure to promote this vital force diminishes existence, and in so, doing leads to a meaningless life.

Readings: 

  • Agada, A., 2020. The African vital force theory of meaning in life. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 100-112.
  • Attoe, A., 2020. Guest Editor’s Introduction: African Perspectives to the question of Life’s Meaning. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 93-99.
  • Attoe, A., 2020. A Systematic Account of African Conceptions of the Meaning of/in Life. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 127-139.
  • Gyekye, K., 1992. Person and Community in Akan Thought. In: K. Wiredu & K. Gyekye, eds. Person and Community. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, pp. 101-122.
  • Metz, T., 2020. African Theories of Meaning in Life: A Critical Assessment. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 113-126.
  • Tempels, P., 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine.

Lecture Four: Ubuntu: Communal Nortive Function Theory Of Meaning

In the fourth class, we will examine African communal normative function theories of meaning (Attoe, 2020). We will consider how, as a generalised form of African humanism, summarised in the following Bantu aphorisms “a person is a person through other people”, communal normative function theories of meaning draw on African relational ontologies to locate meaning in enhancing communal harmony and ensuring a positive relationship with others in the community. By ensuring a positive engagement with others in the community, the individual attains humanity, and by attaining and fostering this humanity, the individual acquires meaning as well.

Readings: 

  • Attoe, A., 2020. Guest Editor’s Introduction: African Perspectives to the question of Life’s Meaning. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 93-99.
  • Metz, T., 2020. African Theories of Meaning in Life: A Critical Assessment. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 113-126.
  • Gyekye, K., 1992. Person and Community in Akan Thought. In: K. Wiredu & K. Gyekye, eds. Person and Community. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, pp. 101-122.
  • Motsamai Molefe, Critical Comments on Afro-Communitarianism: The Community Versus Individual, in Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, (January-June 2017) 6:1.

Lecture Five–Is Human Existence a Tragedy Afterall? Cases Against African Approaches to the Meaning of Life

Having expounded and assessed the vistas of thought opened up by different African philosophies of the meaning of life, lecture five will examine how plausible these theories of meaning are. Are these theories compelling in explaining the conferral of the meaning in life, or have they been unsuccessful in overcoming the pessimism of Camus’ critical reflection on a meaningful life (Agada 2020)?

Readings: 

  • Agada, A., 2020. The African vital force theory of meaning in life. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 100-112.
  • Metz, T., 2020. African Theories of Meaning in Life: A Critical Assessment. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), pp. 113-126.